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This research is concerned with determining how subjects falsify statements like A collie 
is a cat. A multiple regression analysis was performed which used 22 variables to try to predict 
the negative judgment times. The predictive variables are time to generate the superordinate 
of the instance (for example, dog), time to falsify that the superordinate is the predicate 
(for example, A dog is a cat), and time to encode the instance. This finding and others 
indicate that a prominent negation strategy is one in which the subject generates the superset 
of an instance and falsifies that the superset is the predicate. Auxiliary regression analyses 
are also reported for other reaction time measures gathered in the experiments. It is argued 
that large-scale regression experiments are critical to the inferential logic of a semantic 
memory experiment. 
In the past five years or so, the topic of seman- 
tic memory has become a very active area of 
experimental research. This paper presents a 
relatively different approach in trying to 
understand subjects' performance in semantic 
memory tasks. Several of the major theoretical 
analyses in this field are discussed first. We 
raise some interpretive problems with earlier 
studies, and with these considerations in 
mind, offer our own method for investigating 
the semantic memory paradigm and analyzing 
its data. 
The study of Collins and Quillian (1969) 
was instrumental in stirring interest in semantic 
memory. They proposed that our categorical 
knowledge was stored in a strict hierarchical 
fashion. They claimed, for instance, that we 
have directly stored Collies are dogs and 
Dogs are mammals  but not Collies are mam- 
mals. To verify this last fact, a subject would 
have to retrieve the first two and with these 
infer the truth of the third. This proposal 
has been called the cognitive economy 
hypothesis because it reduces memory re- 
quirements to a logical minimum. The 
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hypothesis predicts subjects should be faster 
to verify facts like Collies are dogs, which can 
be directly retrieved, than facts like Collies are 
mammals,  which require inferences. This 
prediction was verified by Collins and 
Quillian (1969). 
The problem with this outcome is that it is 
subject to multiple interpretations. For in- 
stance, Anderson and Bower (1973, Chap. 12) 
argue that subjects do store information like 
Collies are mammals  even when that infor- 
mation is redundant with other information 
in memory. However, information like Collies 
are dogs tends to be more available than 
Collies are mammals.  This is because one fact 
is more frequently thought of than another. 
For instance, dog occurs more frequently as a 
superset to collie in a constrained association 
task (Loftus & Scheff, 1971). Glass, Holyoak, 
and O'Dell (1974) have found such generation 
frequencies to be good predictors in semantic 
memory tasks. 
Another explanation (for example, Meyer, 
1970; Landauer & Meyer, 1972) is that the 
Collins and Quillian results are an artifact of 
the sizes of the categories mammal  versus dog. 
Because dog has fewer instances it can be 
more quickly searched to see if collie is a 
member. Meyer and Ellis (1970) found cate- 
gory size effects in judgments about whether 
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a nonword like mafer is a member of a cate- 
gory. In such a situation subjects could not be 
searching for mafer in a conceptual hierarchy. 
Another explanation has to do with the 
similarity (measured in terms of feature 
overlap) between collie and dog versus the 
similarity between collie and mammal. Con- 
cepts that tend to be more distant in a con- 
ceptual hierarchy have fewer features in 
common. They tend to be rated as less 
similar by subjects (Rips, Shoben, & Smith, 
1973). Schaeffer and Wallace (1970) propose 
subjects prime a positive response (lower their 
threshold for saying true) when two concepts 
are similar. Smith, Shoben, and Rips (in 
press) propose that a second stage of a two 
stage model is either invoked or not on the 
basis of a first-stage similarity judgment. They 
find ratings of similarity are better predictors 
of judgment times than distance in a con- 
ceptual hierarchy. 
There have been two developments in 
response to this multiplicity of theories. The 
first has been the recognition of the diagnostic 
value of negative judgments. For instance, 
how do subjects judge a probe like A St. 
Bernard is a cat or A typhoon is a wheat ? The 
general result is that subjects are slower the 
more similar the two concepts or the closer 
they are in conceptual hierarchy (Meyer, 
1970; Collins & Quillian, 1972; Smith et al., 
in press). Thus subjects are slower in falsifying 
the first negative example above. This result 
is completely counter to what Collins and 
Quillian had originally predicted. The result 
does correspond nicely to the predictions of 
the similarity model since similar negatives 
would tend to bias a positive response. 
Unelaborated, the associative availability and 
category size models do not make any 
predictions with respect to similarity. How- 
ever, the conditions in Meyer's (1970) model 
for obviating stage two act functionally as a 
test for semantic similarity; Holyoak and 
Glass (unpublished) also provide an ex- 
planation for the similarity effect within an 
associative frequency model. 
Interpretive Problems 
The other recent development in semantic 
memory has been a recognition of the inter- 
pretative problems posed by the nature of a 
semantic memory experiment (for example, 
Anderson & Bower, 1973; Clark, 1973; 
Landauer & Meyer, 1972). The basic problem 
is that the experimenter cannot randomly 
construct the material that he will present to 
his subject; he must select his stimuli from 
what the language makes available. The 
typical strategy is to partition materials into 
conditions on the basis of some property 
they possess such as similarity or category 
size. If  differences are found between con- 
ditions, there is no way to discover whether 
this was due to the prescribed variable or 
some unknown variable that covaried with it. 
We have noted how hierarchical distance, 
associative availability, category size, and 
similarity tend to covary making the original 
Collins and Quillian result uninterpretable. 
There are many other variables that might be 
underlying the observed effects. 
The basic point is that the underlying logic 
of a semantic memory experiment is not that 
of a true experiment with controlled manipu- 
lation of an independent variable; rather, it is 
correlational. That is, there is some variable, 
such as similarity, which naturally varies over 
stimulus materials. An experimenter obtains 
reaction time judgments to these materials 
and determines how the naturally occurring 
variable correlates with the experimentally 
obtained reaction times. Despite the frequent 
bias in experimental psychology against 
correlational research, this approach is capable 
of being used for developing and testing 
scientific theories. It has been used to great 
effect in other fields, for example, economics. 
However, if correlational research is to be 
useful it must be recognized as such and 
analyzed in a sophisticated manner. One 
necessary step to achieving this sophistication 
is to abandon past procedures which looked 
at only one or two variables; instead one 
must perform multiple regression analyses 
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that consider simultaneously the effects of 
many partially covarying variables to deter- 
mine which are the effective predictors of 
reaction time. We do not mean to imply that 
by simply examining dozens of variables we 
will come to an understanding of semantic 
memory. Careful theoretical analysis and 
model testing is required. However, a pre- 
liminary to these more focused enterprises 
is simply the task of finding out what variables 
are the effective predictors in a semantic 
memory experiment. 
Loftus and Suppes (1972) provide an ex- 
ample of the use of multiple regression to 
analyze a semantic memory task. In their 
experiment, subjects were required to generate 
an instance of a specified category that began 
with a specified letter. They used twelve 
dependent variables to predict generation 
times. These variables included measures of 
frequency of category, frequency of the correct 
instance, and dominance of the instance in 
Battig-Montague norms. Battig-Montague 
dominance was the best predictor. This 
supports the Anderson and Bower and the 
Glass et al. models which relate reaction 
time to production frequency. Frequency 
measures were also good predictors. However, 
Loftus and Suppes did not use the measure of 
similarity which Smith et al. claim should be 
more effective. 
Another development in semantic memory 
is the recent statistical critique provided by 
Clark (1973). He pointed out that typically 
in semantic memory experiments words are 
grouped into a number of conditions depend- 
ing on variables such as category size. The stat- 
istical test usually employed attempts to assess 
whether the differences between conditions are 
reliable across subjects, and not whether they 
are reliable over the words in the conditions. 
Clark calls this sort of analysis thelanguage-as- 
fixed-effects fallacy. He recommends a proce- 
dure whereby the statistical test simultaneously 
generalizes over materials and subjects. 
As Clark, points out, however, this 
procedure is only appropriate when the ma- 
terials are randomly sampled. Verbal learning 
experiments exemplify those paradigms in 
which random selection of stimuli for con- 
ditions is possible: Study time, number of 
presentations, or any number of other factors 
can be used with any sets of words. In a 
semantic memory experiment, however, one 
never really samples materials at random from 
the total population available. Rather one 
chooses materials that constitute the experi- 
mental conditions in a somewhat haphazard 
way. The sampling is necessarily haphazard 
because the total population of stimuli with a 
certain trait (for example, high cooccurrence 
frequency) is not well-defined. 
The procedure advocated by Clark uses 
variability within the sample material to 
estimate how well the obtained results will 
generalize to other samples of material. 
Mosteller and Tukey (1968) point out that 
there is a potential danger in any statistical 
procedure that uses variability within the 
sample materials to generalize the results 
to other samples. Variability within the sample 
may be much less than within the total 
population. As a consequence it has frequently 
been found in correlational research that 
significant (measured by within-sample var- 
iance) effects were not replicated when 
different samples were used. There are no 
fully adequate solutions to this dilemma. 
However, a move in the direction of safety is 
to try to use large samples of wide hetero- 
geneity or to sample exhaustively. This helps 
remove the problem of generalizing from one 
sample to others. This experiment uses a 
large sample of materials. 
The statistics advocated by Clark are still 
an improvement over existing procedures. 
We too, use a statistical procedure that makes 
use of variability among the materials in the 
sample. However, we wish to point out that, 
because of biased sampling, one should be 
suspicious of the conclusions of these tests 
and that one should attempt to deal with the 
problems of generalization by using large and 
heterogeneous samples. 
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Theoretical Attitudes 
Our principal concern in this paper is 
with the times taken to judge that an instance 
like collie is not a member of a category like 
cat. As noted earlier, these data on negative 
judgments seem to have a particularly 
diagnostic role in identifying the correct 
theory. Our attitude in this research is some- 
what atheoretical. That  is, we are simply 
trying to determine which of the possibly 
relevant variables predict negative time. 
Our preexperimental notions about what is 
involved in the task, however, caused us to 
collect some dependent measures that we 
might not have otherwise. These theoretical 
biases should be stated: We assume that if a 
subject sees A collie is a cat, he searches the 
set of propositions he knows about collies and 
cats. If  he finds a subset of propositions which 
contradicts the original statement he will 
respond false. There are many possible sets of 
propositions that one could retrieve that 
logically imply the falsity of the statement, 
for example: 
1. Collies are not cats.* 
2. Lassie is a collie. 
Lassie is not a cat.* 
3. A collie is a dog. 
I like all dogs. 
I do not like cats.* 
4. Collies are big. 
Cats are small. 
Big is the opposite of small.* 
5. A collie is a dog. 
A dog is not a cat.* 
Two factors would seem to control which 
of the many conceivable means a subject 
uses for falsifying a particular statement. 
The first is whether the requisite set of propo- 
sitions is stored in memory. For  instance, the 
first possibility Collies are not eats would be a 
quick route for falsification, but it is unlikely 
that many of us have that proposition stored 
in memory. The second factor is simply the 
relative availability of the various sets of 
propositions in memory. 
We suspect that subjects are likely to 
falsify statements involving specific categories 
like collie by retrieving some more general 
superset of the category like dog and then 
falsifying A dog is a cat. That is, we suspect 
methods like (3) and (5) are particularly 
likely. Therefore, among our measures are the 
times to generate supersets to low level 
instances like collie and the time to falsify 
that the superset is another category. We 
expected both these times would predict the 
time to falsify that the low level instance is a 
member of the other category. 
RESEARCH STRATEGY 
In a number of experiments to be described 
below, we obtained 23 measures to predict 
various reaction time decisions in our seman- 
tic memory tasks. The materials or stimuli 
remained constant across the various ex- 
periments; so, their construction should be 
described first. 
Forty category names were selected. This 
exhausted most of the categories we could 
think of that passed the criteria that (a) they 
be one word (that is, not categories like 
musical instruments); (b) they be distinct from 
all other categories used; (c) they have gener- 
ally recognized instances; and (d) they have 
relatively many instances of both high and low 
dominance. From each category, two in- 
stances were selected such that, intuitively, 
one instance seemed a salient member of the 
category and the second a nonsalient member 
of the category. This yielded 80 instance- 
category pairs. For each of the forty categories 
a second category was chosen such that it was 
disjoint from the first. These would serve as the 
negative categories for the false statements. 
The negative categories were constructed by 
repermuting the positive categories so that the 
range of similarity of the instances to the 
negative categories varied as much as possible. 
Thus the basic material were 80 triples con- 
sisting of an instanee, a positive category, and 
a negative category. These are given in the 
Appendix. 
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Table  1 lists the 23 var iables  col lected in the 
exper iments  to be described.  The  var iables  are  
organized  into groups  to be expla ined later.  
M o r e  deta i led explanat ions  of  the mean ing  of  
each var iable  and  how the statistics were 
ob ta ined  is given in the exper iments  
below. 
as the pred ica te  in a ca tegor ical  s ta tement .  
The p rocedure  used for  ga ther ing  reac t ion  
t imes was as fol lows:  A p p r o x i m a t e l y  one 
second after  the exper imenter  said " r e a d y "  
the slide was backpro jec ted  onto  a screen, 
s tar t ing a t imer.  The subject 's  hand  res ted  on a 
neu t ra l  te legraph key  between posi t ive and  
TABLE 1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR REGRESSION VARIABLES 
Standard Proportion 
Variable Mean deviation Error attenuation 
1. INT--instance negation time 1026 92 42 .89 
2. INF--instance and negative category conjoint 
frequency 1.40 1.19 .49 .91 
3. INS--instance and negative category similarity 1.71 .96 .29 .95 
4. CNT--category negation time 1021 99 30 .95 
5. CNF--category and negative category conjoint 
frequency 2.21 1.41 .21 .99 
6. CNS---category and negative category similarity 2.23 1.02 .25 .97 
7. IVT--instance verification time 972 72 42 .81 
8. CGT--corrected generation time 398 252 81 .95 
9. 1CF--instance and category conjoint frequency 4.73 .98 .46 .88 
I0. 1CS instance and category similarity 5.26 .74 .39 .85 
11. CGD--category generation dominance 22.2 6.6 2.4 .93 
12. IFR--instance frequency 32 82 - - 
13. IIF--inverse instance frequency .27 .33 - - 
14. IRT instance reading time 739 166 73 .90 
15. IMT--instance meaning time 518 95 56 .81 
16. CFR category frequency 108 172 - - 
17. CIF--inverse category frequency .05 .09 - - 
18. CRT--category reading time 641 134 73 .84 
19. CMT--category meaning time 496 65 56 .51 
20. NFR negative category frequency 108 172 - - 
21. NIF--inverse negative category frequency .05 .09 - - 
22. NRT--negative category reading time 641 134 73 .84 
23. NMT--negative category meaning time 496 65 56 .51 
Experiment I 
This exper iment  ob ta ined  the t imes for  sub- 
jects  to judge  whether  one word  was a subset  
o f  another .  Two words  were typed  on  a slide, 
one above  the other.  The subject  was to t rea t  
the top  word  as A and  the b o t t o m  word  as B in 
the  phrase  An A is a B, or in other  words,  the 
top  word  as the subject  and  the b o t t o m  word  
negative keys. The subject  moved  his finger to 
hi t  one of  the keys and  indicate  his decision. 
This s topped  the t imer.  The  exper imenter  
recorded  the reac t ion  t ime and  in fo rmed  the 
subject  i f  his decis ion was incorrect .  
The subject  was given 10 pract ice trials and  
then p roceeded  to make  judgmen t s  o f  320 
pairs.  There  were 80 pairs  o f  each of  four  
types. There  were posi t ive instances which were 
NEGATIVE JUDGMENTS IN SEMANTIC MEMORY 669 
created by pairing each of the 80 instances in 
the Appendix with its positive category. 
There were negative instance statements 
created by pairing each instance with its 
negative category. There were negative cate- 
gory statements which were constructed by 
pairing the positive category with its negative 
category. Since there were only 40 distinct 
pairs of positive categories and negative 
categories, each negalive category statement 
was repeated twice in the 320 trials. Finally, 
there were positive category statements which 
were taken by pairing the positive category 
with some superset. There were two copies of 
each of these 40 positive category pairs. 
The mean verification time for each negative 
instance across subjects was the first variable, 
I N T  for instance negation time, in our regres- 
sion analysis. This variable is the principal 
measure to be predicted. Mean time to negate 
categories (for example, A dog is a snake) was 
variable 4 in the regression analysis, CNT for 
category negation time.Mean time to verify posi- 
tive instances (for example A collie is a dog) was 
variable 7, I V T  for instance verification time. 
The positive category times were not used in 
the regression analysis because a number of 
categories shared the same superset, (for 
example, activity) and hence the superset had 
to be used an uncontrolled number of times. 
These trials were only employed to provide 
a balance of materials. The 320 pairs were 
placed in random order in four Carousel 
trays of 80 slides. Order of these slide trays 
was counterbalanced over subjects. 
Twenty-four subjects were recruited from 
the general population of students and local 
residents available in the Yale University 
community during the summer. Each of  the 
24 possible permutations of the four slide 
trays was used with a different subject. They 
were paid $2.00 for participation in an 
experiment that lasted about an hour. 
Experiment I I  
This experiment was performed to obtain 
an estimate of how long it took a subject to 
generate a superset to each of the 80 instances. 
An instance was backprojected onto a screen 
before the subject, starting a timer. He was 
to respond vocally with a superset. His 
response triggered a voice key which stopped 
a clock. His response and reaction time were 
recorded. Subjects went through three lists of  
these 80 instances. The order of lists was 
counterbalanced across subjects. The order of  
instances within a set was random. 
The voice key apparatus seemed to intro- 
duce a lot of systematic error into the reaction 
times. For instance, the category state did not 
tend to trigger the voice key until the emission 
of the stop t. In general, the apparatus seemed 
insensitive to fricatives like s. Also there 
probably were differences in the speed with 
which a subject could initiate the articulation 
of different words. This motivated us to derive 
a measure of generation time that would be 
independent of articulation. Subjects showed 
a considerable speed-up over the three 
passes through the 80 instances. Mean 
reaction time for the first set was 1407 msec; 
for the second set, 1095 msec; and for the 
third set, 1009 msec. We speculated that by 
the third pass the subject's response was 
usually an automatic recall of a response he 
had learned in the first two passes. If  so, a 
useful measure would be first generation time 
minus third generation time. The third gener- 
ation time would subtract out the stimulus 
encoding and response generation times in the 
first generation time. This would just leave 
the time to mentally generate the category. 
This difference measure gave us variable 8 
in the regression analysis, CGT for corrected 
generation time. 
Table 2 presents the matrix of correlations 
among reaction times for first, second, third, 
and corrected generation times. For  each 
instance we used its mean reaction time 
averaged over subjects. The correlations are 
computed across these 80 instances. Note that 
all correlations are positive. In particular the 
correlation between third generation time and 
corrected generation time is positive. This 
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indicates that whatever corrected generation 
time measures, some of it still remains in the 
third generation time. Presumably, subjects 
occasionally still generate in this third 
generation condition rather than just retrieve 
a learned response. 
All the subjects did not generate the same 
superordinate to all instances. We counted 
the frequency of the most frequent super- 
ordinate to each instance on the first pass 
through the material. There were 30 subjects 
in this experiment and the response frequency 
of an instanee's most salient category ranged 
from 6 to 30. This was the measure of the 
existence of a dominant categorization re- 
sponse to each instance. This variable pro- 
vided variable 11 in the regression analysis, 
CGD for category generation dominance. 
judge for each item whether it was a word or 
nonword. In the second part of the experi- 
ment the subject was shown the 120 words 
and was asked to indicate by a button press 
when he had thought of the word's meaning. 
The first task has been studied rather ex- 
tensively (for example, Meyer & Schvane- 
veldt, 1971; Meyer & Ellis, 1970; Rubenstein, 
Garfield, & Millikan, 1970). There appear to 
be effects of word frequency, polysemy, and 
associative priming. The only study we know 
of that used the Second task was Moore (1915). 
A priori, we had no way to decide which task 
would give a better estimate of time to encode 
a word. 
The experiment was run in five groups on the 
IBM 1800 at the Human Performance 
Center at the University of Michigan. Subjects 
TABLE 2 
CORRELATIONS AMONG GENERATION TIME MEASURES 
First generation time Second generation time Third generation time 
Second generation time .75 
Third generation time .40 .61 
Corrected generation time .94 .57 .31 
Thirty subjects were recruited from the 
general population of students and local 
residents at Yale in the summer. Five subjects 
were tested with each of the six possible 
orderings of three lists of 80 instances. 
They were paid $1.50 for participation in an 
experiment that lasted about half an hour. 
Experiment I I I  
Time to encode the words may be an 
important factor contributing to differences 
among semantic memory stimuli. Two meas- 
ures were obtained in this experiment of the 
time to encode the words that comprised the 
triples in the Appendix. In the first part of the 
experiment subjects saw the 120 words (80 
instances plus 40 categories) mixed in with 
120 nonwords. The subject's task was to 
sat in individual booths and responded to 
stimuli presented to them on the C R T  screen. 
In the word judgment task, a word or nonword 
appeared on the screen and the subject 
pressed a positive or negative button to 
indicate his judgment. Feedback consisted 
of either the phrase You are right or You are 
wrong printed on the screen. One second after 
this feedback disappeared from the screen 
the next word was presented. Reaction time 
was measured from the word's appearance to 
the subject's button press. A short rest period 
intervened between the first and second tasks. 
The procedure was similar for the meaning 
task. Of course, no feedback was given. The 
next stimulus appeared 2 sec after the disap- 
pearance of the old stimulus from the screen. 
This experiment yielded six more measures 
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for the regression analysis. Variable 14 was 
the time to make a word judgment about the 
instance, IRT for instance reading time. 
Variable 15 was IMT, instance meaning time. 
Variable 18 was time to make a word judgment 
about the positive category for a triple, CRT. 
Variable 19 was the corresponding category 
meaning time, CMT. Variable 22 was the 
reading time for the negative category, NRT. 
Variable 23 was the corresponding meaning 
time, NMT. 
Thirteen subjects were recruited for this 
experiment from the University of Michigan 
student population. The experiment lasted 
about 30 rain and they were paid $1.50 for their 
services. 
Rating measures 
A number of analyses of semantic memory 
identify frequency as a relevant variable in 
semantic memory (for example, Anderson & 
Bower, 1973; Conrad, 1972; Glass, Holyoak, 
& O'Dell, 1974; Loftus & Suppes, 1972; 
Wilkins, 1971), In particular, the frequency 
with which two words co-occur together is 
thought to be critical in determining the 
number of connections between the words and 
the availability of these connections. Therefore 
we had subjects rate how frequently they 
thought of each of the three types of pairs 
derivable from the triples. Judgments of 
frequency of instance and category co- 
occurrence constituted variable 9, ICF, for 
instance and category conjoint frequency. 
Variable 2 is the rating of eooccurrence fre- 
quency of the instance and the negative category 
with which it appeared in Experiment I, INF. 
Variable 5 is the rating of cooccurrence fre- 
quency of the positive and negative category. 
Different groups of subjects made the ratings 
of different types of pairs. Subjects were asked 
to rate the pairs on a 0-7 scale where 0 
indicated they never thought of the words 
together and 7 that they always thought of the 
words together. The word pair vanilla and 
embrace was given as an illustration of a pair 
which was almost never thought of together. 
Peanut butter and jelly were suggested as a 
pair which was frequently thought of together. 
The Smith et al. analysis identifies simil- 
arity in meaning as the controlling variable 
in semantic memory tasks. Three more 
variables were obtained by getting measures 
of the similarity of the three types of pairs. 
Variable 10 was similarity of  instance and 
positive category, ICS. Variable 3 was similarity 
of instance and negative category, INS. 
Variable 6 was similarity of  positive and 
negative category, CNS. Different groups of 
subjects gave the different ratings. For INS 
and CNS, subjects were simply told to rate the 
pairs as to similarity of meaning on a 0-7 scale. 
On that scale 0 meant totally different and 7 
meant practically identical. As an example of a 
very dissimilar pair they were given vanilla 
and embrace. As an example of a very similar 
pair they were given jelly and jam. We thought 
it strange to ask subjects to rate the similarity 
of an instance to its category. So for ICS 
ratings we asked subjects to rate how typical 
the instance was of the category on a 0-7 
scale with 0 indicating very atypical and 7 
indicating most typical. Such typicality ratings 
are considered by Smith et al. to be the best 
measure of what they mean by similarity. 
Ten Yale summer subjects gave the INF 
ratings. The other ratings came from Michigan- 
subjects. There was relatively high agreement 
among raters, so large numbers of subjects 
were considered unnecessary. The numbers of 
subjects giving the various ratings were: 
ICF, 8; NCF, 9; ICS, 14; INS, 12; and CNS, 
13. 
RESULTS 
In addition to the variables described 
above we used the word frequency of  the in- 
stance (Variable 12, IFR), of the positive 
category (Variable 16, CFR), and of the 
negative category (Variable 20, NFR). Word 
frequency has been found to correlate 
negatively with word judgment time (Ruben- 
stein et al., 1970). Thus we are using word 
672 A N D E R S O N  A N D  REDER 
frequency as a measure of encoding time. The 
measures were taken from the Ku6era and 
Francis (1967) word count. Loftus and Suppes 
(1972) suggest that the inverse frequency 
measure is better because it eliminates the 
extreme range of scores. Since we had an 
occasional zero frequency word, we took the 
inverse of one plus the frequency. This gave 
the following inverse frequency measures: 
Variable 13, I I F =  1/(1 +IFR);  Variable 17, 
CIF= 1/(1 + CFR); and Variable 21, N I F =  
1/(1 + NFR). 
Summary statistics about the 23 variables 
are displayed in Table 1. For  each variable 
(except CG D and word frequency measures) and 
for each of the 80 triples a mean value was 
computed over subjects. These means, the 
CGD count, and the frequency counts for 
each triple served as the data for the regression 
analysis. The mean of these values, across 
triples, is given under Mean in Table 1 for each 
variable. The standard deviation of these 
values is also given. The standard deviation 
reflects both systematic differences among the 
triples and random error in measurement. 
For  those variables whose means were 
obtained by averaging subject data, it is 
possible to obtain an estimate of the error 
in measurement from the subject x item 
interaction. These standard errors are given 
under Error in Table 1. An error estimate for 
variable l l ,  CGD, was obtained by the 
formula (p(1 - p ) n )  ÷ for a binomial variable. 
It was not possible to calculate an estimate of 
error for the word frequencies. 
In the final column the proportion attenu- 
ation due to error is given of a correlation 
between that variable and another variable. 
Let us explain the calculation of this quantity: 
Let s~ denote the standard deviation of the X 
scores and se their standard error of measure- 
ment. The proportion attentuation is given 
by the following formula (see McNemar, 
1962): 
Se 2 
rxx = 1 - - - .  
Sx 2 
The square root of rxx is the quantity we are 
referring to as proportion attenuation. Sup- 
pose rt is the true correlation between X and 
I:, then the observed correlation, rxy, will be 
somewhat smaller because of errors of meas- 
ure in X and Y. McNemar gives a formula 
for rx~ in terms of rt, rx,, and r~y: 
r~, = rt " (r~x) ~" (r,,) -~ 
Thus, we want the proportion of attenuation 
to be near 1 to have a maximally sensitive 
regression analysis. The attenuations are all 
tolerable except for variable 19, CMT, and 
variable 23, NMT.  
The variables have been organized in Table 
1 into seemingly natural groups. Variables 
1-3 measure the connection between instance 
and negative category; variables 4-6 the 
connection between positive and negative 
category; variables 7-11 the connection 
between instance and positive category; 
variables 12-15 the encodability of the 
instance; variables 16-19 the encodability of 
the categories; variables 20-23 the encoda- 
bility of the negative categories. 
Analysis of  Instance Verification Time 
A regression analysis was performed using 
variable 7, IVT, as the independent variable 
and the other 22 variables as dependent 
variables. The results of a stepwise forward 
multiple regression analysis are reported in 
Table 3a. 
We report six multiple regression analyses 
in Table 3. These are central to the con- 
clusions of the paper. Therefore, it is im- 
portant to understand the nature of the step- 
wise forward method. This method first 
selects that variable, among the 22, which is 
most highly correlated with the dependent 
variable. The first variable selected will often 
not predict all explainable variance in the 
dependent variable. I f  not, the stepwise 
forward method will select next the variable 
that best predicts the unexplained variance. 
That is, it selects second the variable which has 
the highest correlation with the dependent 
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variable, partialling out the first predictor 
variable. It keeps adding variables to the 
regression equation as long as they signifi- 
cantly increase the amount of variance pre- 
dicted. The regression equations at the 
bottom of the panels in Table 3 give the best 
fitting linear equations using all the variables 
selected by the stepwise forward method. 
There are serious problems in such multiple 
regression analysis. We are trying to find 
which set of variables from the 22 available 
does the best job of predicting the dependent 
variable. Obviously, we could use all 22 and 
account for the maximum variance, but many 
variables would proably make insignificant 
contributions to the variance produced. 
TABLE 3 
SUMMARY OF STEPWISE REGRESSION ANALYSES 
Variables 
Variable to be predicted entering regression Multiple R Significance 
(a) 7. I V T  11. C G D  .386 .0004 
12. I F R  .461 .0152 
I V T =  1078 - 4.46 C G D - . 2 2  IFR 
(b) 1. I N T  4. C N T  .545 .0001 
14. I R T  .630 .0006 
8. C G T  .669 .0100 
I N T =  526 + .59 C N T +  .38 I R T +  .29 C G T  
(c) 4. C N T  5. C N F  .659 .0001 
21. N I F  .713 .0011 
1. I N T  .748 .0041 
18. C R T  .770 .0144 
C N T =  573 + 39.5 C N F +  2 7 9 N I F +  .25 1 N T +  .14 C R T  
(d) 14 + 15. I E T  13. I I F  .483 .0001 
12. IFR .530 .0269 
23. N M T  .564 .0447 
I E T =  856 + 287 I I F - . 2 8  IFR + . 2 3 N M T  
(e) 8. C G T  11. C GD .585 .0001 
IO. I C S  .638 .0048 
2. I N F  .669 .0210 
15. I M T  .693 .0317 
16. C F R  .716 .0280 
C G T =  1009 - 18 C GD - 105 I C S  + 64.6 1 N F  + .55 I M T -  .28 CFR 
(f) I. I N T w i t h o u t  CNT,  IRT ,  or C G T  5. C N F  .494 
10. I C S  .574 
I N T =  1140-t- 35.8 C N F -  33.5 I C S  
.0001 
.0025 
The multiple-R reported in Table 3 is a 
measure of the goodness of regression equa- 
tion using that variable and the preceding 
variables. The square of this quantity is the 
proportion of variance explained. The sig- 
nificance of the additional variance explained 
by adding each variable is also reported in 
Table 3. 
There are, in fact, 222 possible sets of variables 
to consider. The stepwise forward method is 
not guaranteed to find the optimal set, but 
often will. There are particular problems with 
any approach when two predictor variables 
are highly correlated with each other and 
approximately equally correlated with the 
dependent variable. Then, it is hard to reliably 
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assess the contribution of each to the re- 
gression. We have tried to be sensitive to this 
danger. However, so that the reader can assess 
this matter for himself we have published the 
entire correlation matrix in the Appendix. 
These are the correlations among the 23 
variables computed across the 80 triples also 
fisted in the Appendix. 
As can be seen from Table 3a, two variables 
are significantly related to IVT. The most 
significant is CGD, the measure of the 
dominance of some categorization response 
to the instance. The other was the measure 
of instance frequency. Both variables suggest 
that a prominent strategy for instance veri- 
fication is for the subject to enter memory from 
the instance and generate categories attempt- 
ing to obtain a match to the probed category. 
According to this strategy, subjects should be 
faster with instances which have a dominant 
category (so long as the dominant category is 
the predicate of the test pair; this was the case 
for 67 of the 80 items). This strategy also 
predicts that the speed at which the subject 
can encode the instance should be more 
critical to latencies than the speed at which he 
can encode the category. The variables IFR, 
IIF, IRT, and IMT are all intended as meas- 
ures of encoding time and all correlate 
appropriately with IVT. However, IFR has 
the strongest correlation with IVTwhen CGD 
is partialled out. Therefore, it was the one that 
entered into the regression analysis. 
Analysis of Instance Negation Times 
The variable of prime concern to this paper 
is INT. Table 3b presents the regression of this 
variable, taking all other variables as de- 
pendent. The three significant predictor 
variables were CNT, 1RT, and CGT. These 
are all consistent with the strategy we pro- 
posed: A subject falsifies an instance state- 
ment by generating a category and determining 
if the retrieved category is disjoint from the 
probed category. Subjects should take longer 
to negate an instance the longer it takes them 
to generate a category (CGT) and the longer 
it takes them to negate the category (CNT). 
Since the process starts from the instance, 
time to encode the instance should be more 
critical than time to encode the predicate, 
that is, the negative category. This is reflected 
by the significant regression on IRT, the time 
to judge an instance is a word. 
The regression on these three variables is 
highly significant, F(3, 76)=20.5 ;  the im- 
provement in regression due to the other 
variables is not, F(19, 57) = .97. The deviation 
from prediction can be evaluated using the 
estimate of error in INT (see Table 1). This 
residual variance turns out to be quite 
significant, F(76, 1722) = 2.73, p < .001. This 
strongly suggests that there are other strate- 
gies for negation which have not been meas- 
ured in any of these variables. Note that the 
coefficients of CNT and CGT in the regression 
equation in Table 3b are not unity as would 
be expected if this were the only strategy 
employed. Also note from Table 2 that INT 
(1026 msec) is only slightly larger than CNT 
(1021 msec). If  subjects always generated the 
category and then falsified that the category 
was the predicate, INT would be considerably 
longer than CNT. 
Almost all strategies for categorical 
negation can logically be used for instance 
negation. That is, the subject can retrieve the 
category from the instance and just apply 
the category negation strategy. However, 
there are strategies for instance negation 
(such as 1, 2, and 4 in the introduction of this 
paper) which do not involve category nega- 
tion. One can think of instance negation 
as being composed of a mixture of some 
strategies which proceed through the category 
and some which do not. This would lead to 
the following formula: 
INT= c~(CGT + CNT) + (1 - ~)XT, 
where ~ represents the probability of a 
strategy through the category and XT is the 
mean time for noncategory strategies. If  
XT< CGT+CNT, this would yield the 
observed near equality of INT and CNT. 
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Meyer (1970) also observed near equality 
of what we call INT and CNT. From this, he 
concluded that subjects do not falsify cate- 
gorical statements by going through a 
superordinate. This conclusion would be 
valid under the assumption that there is 
only one falsification strategy, but it is not 
valid under the more realistic assumption that 
subjects use multiple falsification strategies. 
B~¢ looking at the regression of INT on CNT 
and CGT, we have obtained evidence for 
falsification by category retrieval and this 
evidence does not depend on the assumption 
of a unique strategy. 
The high correlation between INT and 
CNT (r = .55) might, at first, seem suspect. 
That  is, these measures came from the same 
subjects in the same experiments. Moreover, 
the pairs yielding these measures have the 
same predicates. Therefore, part of the 
correlation may reflect communalities in the 
encoding of the predicates, rather than 
communalities in the falsification process. 
Three facts argue against this interpretation: 
First, measures of negative category encoding 
time (NFR, NIF, NRT, and NMT) were not 
strongly related to INT. This suggests en- 
¢oding of the negative category was not a 
critical variable. Second, consider the rela- 
tively low correlation (r = .18; t (78)= 1.64; 
p > .10) between IVT and CNT. These two 
variables also came from the same subjects 
in the same experiment. They involve en- 
coding of a common category, but should have 
no overlap in the verification process. Ap- 
parently, these sources of communality are 
not enough to introduce a significant corre- 
lation between the two variables. 
The third fact is probably the most decisive. 
For each instance negation time, we found the 
average reaction time of the two instance 
verifications whose predicate or category 
is the same as the false predicate. That is, to 
predict the time to falsify tent-metal we took 
the mean of the times to verify copper-metal 
and zinc-metaL This new variable only 
correlated .25 with INT. Partialing out CNT, 
this correlation is reduced to -.004. In con- 
trast, the correlation between INT and CNT 
with this new variable partialled out is still 
.50. Thus, the correlation between INT and 
CNTis not just because they shared a common 
predicate. 
In addition to CNT, two other reaction 
time measures were significant predictors of 
INT in the regression analysis, namely IRT 
(instance reading time) and CGT (corrected 
generation time). Further regression analyses 
were performed to determine what factors 
predicted each of the above three variables. 
The factors which correlate most strongly 
with these three variables are the nonreaction 
time measures, particularly the rating vari- 
ables. The analyses of CNT, IRT, and CGT 
will be discussed below, followed by a re- 
gression of INT in which the reaction time 
variables are removed in order to discover 
which rating variables predict INT. 
Regression of Category Negation Time 
Table 3c reports the stepwise regression for 
CNT. The best predictor was CNF, subject 
ratings of how often they thought of the 
two categories together. CNF turns out 
to be highly correlated (r = .72) with CNS, 
subject ratings of the similarity of the two 
categories: CNS is almost as well correlated 
( r= .61 )  with CNT as is CNF ( r= .66) .  
Clearly, we can make no strong discrimination 
between the two on the basis of this data. 
The Smith et al. theory expects negation time 
to be positively related to similarity since 
similarity between subject and predicate 
biases a positive response. It may not be so 
clear why one would expect a positive re- 
lation between CNF and negation time. 
Cooccurrence ratings could index the 
existence of irrelevant facts connecting the 
two items and these irrelevant facts would 
interfere with the retrieval of the requisite 
negative information. This is one of the 
hypotheses offered by Collins and Quillian 
(1972) to account for negative judgments. 
There were a few pairs in our experiment 
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that separated frequency and similarity. 
Examples of high conjoint frequency, low- 
similarity pairs are weapon-money and music- 
college. Examples of high-similarity, low- 
frequency pairs were dog-snake and tool- 
jewel. Unfortunately our sample did not have 
enough discriminative pairs; nevertheless, 
these measures do not seem inherently 
confounded. 
Table 3c indicates that both measures of 
encoding of the subject (CRT) and of the 
predicate (NIF) are significantly related to 
CNT. It appears that experimental subjects 
show less asymmetry in their processing of 
negative category statements than they do 
for either positive or negative instance 
statements. When subjects deal with these 
instance statements, only measures of subject 
(instance) encoding are significantly related 
to reaction time. For  the pairs that gave us our 
CNT measures, both subjects and predicate 
come from the same pool of 40 categories and 
therefore are at an equal level in a con- 
ceptual hierarchy. The fourth significant 
variable in Table 3c is INT. This is not  
unexpected given the strong relation between 
1NT and CNT in Table 3b. The regression of 
CNT with INT removed still selects the other 
three variables and no others. 
Regression of  Encoding Time 
The best predictor of 1RT, word judgment 
time, is IMT, word meaning time (r = .55). 
Presumably these are measures of approxi- 
mately the same thing and so it does not seem 
too meaningful to let IMT  enter the regression 
of lRT,  thereby soaking up all the explainable 
variance. Therefore, a regression of the sum 
1RT + 1MT was performed and is reported in 
Table 3d. This sum is referred to as instance 
encoding time, IET. Both measures of word 
frequency, 1FR and 11F, are correlated with 
encoding time in a way that indicates high- 
frequency words are more rapidly encoded. 
This supports our use of frequency as a 
correlate of  encoding ease. The entry of the 
third variable N M T  into the regression in 
Table 3d is almost certainly a spurious, chance 
correlation. It only produces a marginally 
significant improvement in prediction. 
Regression of Corrected Generation Time 
Table 3e reports the regression of CGT. 
The two most significant variables are the 
measure of dominance of a category, CGD, 
and the measure of instance prototypicality, 
ICS. The Holyoak and Glass and the Ander- 
son and Bower theories would expect the 
importance of a production frequency meas- 
ure like CGD. The Smith et al. theory predicts 
the importance of ICS. These two variables 
are basically orthogonal for our materials. 
Their intercorrelation is .18. Therefore, it 
might seem that both similarity and frequency 
theories are confirmed. This is consonant 
with our notion that the subject variously 
employs a number of strategies in the veri- 
fication task. 
Three other variables were significant 
• predictors in the regression of CGT: a measure 
of instance encoding time (IMT) and category 
frequency (CFR). Loftus and Suppes also 
found response frequency a significant vari- 
able. Their task was just the opposite of ours: 
Their subjects generated instances to cate- 
gories. Presumably frequency is a measure of 
response availability. The final variable in 
this regression is INF, subject ratings of  
instance and negative category cooecurrence 
frequency. This may reflect the existence of  
extraneous paths from the instance which 
interfere with retrieval of the category. 
Rating Variables as Predictors of l N T  
Table 3f reports the regression of INT when 
the reaction time measures that proved to be 
the best predictors are removed from the 
regression. The two significant measures are 
CNF, subject ratings of positive and negative 
category cooccurrence frequency, and ICS, 
subject ratings of instance and category 
similarity. The first had proved a significant 
predictor of CNT and the second a significant 
predictor of  CGT. These two reaction time 
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measures were significant predictors of I N T  
in Table 3b. Note that I N T  comes from pairs 
that do not mention the positive category, 
but both rating variables do. Neither measure 
of the direct connection between instance 
and negative category, I N F  and INS ,  
proved significant. This is strong evidence 
for our proposed falsification strategy that 
subjects go through the instance's category 
to reject the predicate presented with the 
instance. 
DISCUSSION 
The regression analyses presented above 
indicated that a predominant strategy for 
falsifying As  are Cs is the following: (a) 
Retrieve a superset B of A; (b) attempt to 
verify Bs are Cs. A prediction derived from 
this strategy was confirmed, namely, that the 
time to generate B to A and the time to 
falsify Bs are Cs are both correlated with the 
time to falsify As  are Cs. 
In the introduction, five different sets of 
propositions were listed as possible strategies 
for falsifying one particular statement. It 
should be noted that each set contains one 
asterisked proposition which is a negative 
proposition. A negative proposition is logically 
necessary to reject a statement. Therefore, an 
important factor in determining what strategy 
a subject will use is where negative information 
is stored. It is untenable to suppose that a 
subject stores with every two disjoint cate- 
gories that the one is not the other. As stated 
earlier, it is unlikely that a subject has directly 
stored that Collies are not cats; it does seem 
more reasonable, however, that he has 
stored Dogs are not cats. 
We do not mean to imply that negative 
information is never stored directly with the 
instance, nor that it is always directly stored 
at the immediate superordinate. To negate 
the statement Collies are tractors, one might 
generate the sequence Collies are dogs, Dogs 
are animals, Tractors are machines, and 
Animals  are not machines. In this case, 
retrieving dog, the direct superset of collie, is 
not enough. A superset of dog must also be 
retrieved. Still the time to retrieve dog to 
collie would be part of the negation process. 
One might object to the proposed strategy of 
recursively retrieving supersets until one is 
found which denies the predicate. This would 
seem to predict that less similar items are 
falsifed slower than more similar items, which 
is just the opposite of the usual result. For  
instance, in the above example, more re- 
trievals were required to reject A collie is a 
tractor than A collie is a cat. Two points 
need to be made to this objection. First, we 
do not mean to imply that to falsify A collie 
is a tractor a subject m/~st retrieve animal. 
He may simply retrieve dog and falsify A dog 
is a tractor. The second, related point is that 
subjects may examine many facts simultan- 
eously, looking to see if any can be used for 
confirmation of disconfirmation. This might 
explain why it is easier to disconfirm A dog 
is a tractor than A dog is a cat. The more 
dissimilar the instance to the predicate, the 
faster a disconfirming fact can be found. 
Dogs and cats share many properties (e.g. 
legs, eyes, fur), while tractors and dogs have 
many differences (for example, tractors rust, 
need no food.) 
Our a priori reason for suspecting supersets 
are retrieved from the instance to falsify 
an instance statement is that it seems more 
likely that negative information would be 
stored with large categories. That  negative 
information is likely to be found at large 
cateogories is probably just a reflection of  
which negative propositions one is likely to 
experience and hence learn. 
The notion that negative propositions are 
stored in memory is considered by some to be 
unappealing and unintuitive. Why this 
reaction should occur is not clear to us 
since negative premises must exist in 
order to logically deduce a negative con- 
clusion. This does not mean that people 
necessarily have stored in their heads strings 
of words which include no or not; rather 
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the information structure which we call a 
negative proposition simply must have nega- 
tive logical force. 
There are clear similarities between the 
original Collins and Quillian proposal that 
subjects search for intersections in conceptual 
hierarchies and the proposal that subjects 
retrieve supersets to verify statements. How- 
ever, there are a number of critical differences. 
First, we do not suppose that information 
is only stored at the logically highest level. 
Second, we  do not suppose that subjects will 
reject a particular pair such as collie and cat 
just because they intersect at a common 
superset like animal. Rather, information 
must be retrieved to indicate that one is not a 
subset of the other. Third, this is not proposed 
as the only falsification strategy; we just 
think that it is a likely one. Examples 1, 2, and 
4, given in the introduction to this paper, are 
cases of logical falsifications that do not 
depend on retrieval of the instances' supersets. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The primary goal of this paper was to help 
understand the processes involved in rejecting 
false categorical statements. Regression analy- 
ses were presented using numerous variables 
to predict the time to reject a categorical 
statement. Reaction times, rating variables, 
and frequency norms were used in the pre- 
diction of instance negation time. The 
variables found to be critical are the time to 
generate the superordinate, the time to reject 
a categorical statement which has the same 
predicate but uses the superordinate rather 
than the instance, and the time to encode the 
instance. The prominence of the particular 
negation strategy found in our experiments 
is probably due to the logical nature of the 
task (that is, that subjects should find logically 
disconfirming evidence) and to the fact that 
negative propositions tend to be stored with 
large categories. 
Another goal of this paper was to call 
attention to problems in data analyses in 
most semantic memory tasks. It was pointed 
out that variables used in semantic memory 
studies tend to be correlated and hence 
confounded. Because one cannot randomly 
assign materials to conditions to test whether 
certain "variables" affect reaction times, one 
cannot be certain that the hypothesized 
variable has caused the effect rather than 
some other known or unknown variable 
related to it. 
The present analyses do not tell us anything 
very critical about the nature of memory (for 
example, to help us discriminate between 
network and set-theoretical models). They 
just identify one prominent falsification 
strategy. 




categories Instances categories 
dwelling tent, house metal 
metal copper, zinc spice 
vehicle car, motorcycle weapon 
toy yo-yo, doll country 
beverage milk, eggnog fish 
weapon spear, gun money 
flower camelia, rose insect 
vegetable turnip, carrot fruit 
sport polo, football crime 
ship cruiser, yacht tool 
science chemistry, geology toy 
fish trout, herring disease 
fruit grape, apple pastry 
dance polka, waltz vehicle 
furniture chair, sofa cloth 
crime burglary, arson science 
tool hammer, chisel jewel 
jewel diamond, sapphire tree 
city Reno, London artwork 
money shilling, dollar music 
pastry cake, donut clothing 
artwork etching, painting dwelling 
insect termite, bee bird 
fuel petroleum, propane ship 
tree oak, cedar flower 
college Harvard, Purdue profession 
country Cuba, France relative 
bedding quilt, sheets animal 
cloth cotton, tweed furniture 
spice thyme, pepper beverage 
music jazz, concerto college 
state California, Idaho city 
bird robin, pelican vegetable 
disease cancer, measles fuel 
dog collie, spaniel snake 
profession lawyer, fireman sport 
animal goat, cat state 
relative aunt, niece dance 
clothing shirt, vest, bedding 
snake python, cobra dog 
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